By Kevin Toro Sánchez
Since Assad’s fall in late 2024, Syria’s transitional period continues to carry the weight of a long war. The new period has opened doors for reform, but it has also exposed how fragile the country remains in terms of security, governance and basic social trust. In this context, the new authorities have established two bodies to guide the justice agenda: the National Commission for Transitional Justice and the National Commission for Missing Persons.
This article compares Syria’s early transitional justice efforts with Cambodia’s long journey to truth and accountability through the hybrid Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC). The comparison points to three themes that matter for Syria’s transition: how victims are brought into the process, how civil society helps shape it and what hybrid models can offer. The argument is straightforward: Syria’s “architecture of rebirth” could only take root if nationally driven processes are paired with sustained international support and meaningful participation from Syrian society.
Syria: one year after Assad
Following a 14-year protracted civil war, the Assad regime fell in December 2024. Since then, violence has substantially reduced, and large geographical areas controlled by the central authority, the Kurdish-led administration in the northeast, the Turkish-influenced north, and local armed groups elsewhere paint a fragmented security landscape.
The war claimed over 650,000 lives, and there are over 100,000 who are still missing or forcibly disappeared. Since the ousting of Assad, 1.2 million have returned to the country, and 1.9 million IDPs have returned home. Despite some signs of economic normalisation, such as reopened embassies, easing of selective sanctions, and financial support from several international stakeholders for the country’s rebuilding, these benefits have yet to trickle down. Many returnees face destroyed housing, lack of access to basic services, and joblessness. Housing, land and property disputes are already emerging as major obstacles to sustainable returns and will intersect with any future reparations or truth-seeking efforts.
The justice sector is still finding its footing as fundamental court reform, independence of the judiciary, and fair-trial guarantees remain weak. Social cohesion persists as a key challenge. The uneven territorial control worsens rule-of-law delivery and fuels local grievances, particularly among minority groups such as the Kurdish Syrians, the Alawites, the Druze or the Bedouin. Syrian civil society organisations (CSOs) can play an important role in mapping expectations, thereby preventing state institutions from being directly exposed to politicisation.
In May 2025, the Syrian government established the National Commission for Transitional Justice (NCTJ) and a separate National Commission for Missing Persons (NCMP). While the latter has been more active, including MoUs with civil society to support searches, the NCTJ faces major challenges in resourcing, staffing, and prioritisation, as arrests and investigations announced by other state organs appear ad hoc and are not institutionally linked to NCTJ programming. These early signs suggest the NCTJ is still identifying its priorities and calibrating its institutional mandate.
Cambodia: Lessons and cautions
Both Syria and Cambodia experienced years of authoritarian rule followed by abrupt violent rupture, mass atrocities, and long-term social fragmentation. In both contexts, truth, justice, memory, reparations and victims’ dignity are central to the legitimacy of the emerging state. Meeting these expectations demands practical choices, balancing criminal accountability with truth-seeking, reparations and institutional reform.
The Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) was mandated to investigate the crimes perpetrated by the Khmer Rouge between 17 April 1975 and 6 January 1979. The legacy of its work yields several interesting lessons relevant to Syria.
- Hybrid architecture can combine legitimacy and standards: As a hybrid court, the ECCC combined national and international elements, which bolstered procedural standards while retaining national ownership.
- The establishment of factual records: The ECCC’s proceedings formally established historical facts under legal standards, creating a foundation for reconciliation between former Khmer Rouge cadres and the rest of the population.
- A capacity-building exercise for the domestic judiciary and beyond: Throughout its 16 years of judicial proceedings, cooperation between Cambodian and UN personnel enabled the transfer of legal practice into the domestic system.
- Victim participation matters: The ECCC’s Civil Party (victims recognised by the tribunal) system not only contributed to the legitimisation of the judicial process but also advocated for the inclusion of forced marriage and sexual violence within the scope of investigation in Case 002/02. Additionally, the insistence of victims, CSOs, legal teams, and progressive judges led to amendments to the court’s internal rules and the creation of a system for providing moral and collective reparations.
- Working with the grain: Decades elapsed between the commission of the crimes and the establishment of the ECCC. This was possible only because extensive documentation and early efforts to preserve evidence created a solid factual basis for landmark convictions. For Syria, this underscores the value of early documentation even before formal mechanisms are fully operational.
At the same time, there are important nuances.
- The DDR in Cambodia involved political trade-offs: Reintegration was never a smooth exercise; it entailed compromises and political calculations that were not always popular. Syria’s landscape is even more complex, with foreign fighters, shifting regional alliances and powerful local militias. Yet these very pressures make a credible reintegration strategy not only tricky but indispensable.
A Shared responsibility: the role of CSOs, victims and international stakeholders
These Cambodian lessons highlight a central parallel: in both contexts, accountability mechanisms depended on documentation and participation generated outside state institutions. Syria already possesses this infrastructure.
Syrian civil society such as the Syria Justice and Accountability Centre, the Syrian Women’s Political Movement, Madaniya, the Syrian Network for Human Rights, Syrians for Truth and Justice and victim groups such as Synergy Association for Victims (Hevdestî) have already produced robust documentation, supported universal jurisdiction cases, developed database software to preserve and analyse evidence, facilitated the creation of the UN General Assembly-established International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism (IIIM) and the Independent Institution on Missing Persons in the Syrian Arab Republic (IIMP), and prepared transitional justice roadmaps.
Universal-jurisdiction prosecutions in France, Germany and Sweden, and IIIM documentation can help shape emerging national approaches by setting early precedents and laying down a basic factual record that can serve as deterrents and challenge impunity, whilst the domestic security and judicial mechanisms adopt appropriate international standards.
In addition to evidence preservation, Syrian CSOs can support victim outreach, provide legal aid and psychosocial services, facilitate community dialogues, document reparations inventories, and conduct public education on transitional justice mechanisms.
On their part, donors and international agencies can assist with four concurrent tasks: (1) financing long-term state-led transitional justice mechanisms and additional supportive CSO-led; (2) support impartial forensic and archival systems, including grave mapping and investing in evidence management infrastructure; (3) facilitate technical expertise support without undermining local ownership; and (4) safeguard civic space by understanding the complimentary value that CSOs who gather evidence, intermediate with communities or serve as accountability watchdogs have in the process.
My previous work designing participatory processes in Cambodia shows how state institutions and civil society can collaborate even in tense political contexts. Three elements stand out as particularly crucial for Syria: (1) to build shared spaces where civil society organisations and state institutions can work out priorities together, rather than operating in parallel; (2) to ensure that survivors can feed into policy discussions in ways that actually influence decisions; and (3) to create safe and steady channels for groups who have historically been ignored or marginalised to explain what they need, without risking political exposure.
Final reflections
Whilst Cambodia’s experience cannot be mapped directly onto Syria’s far more complex geopolitical landscape, specific lessons remain instructive.
The scope of Syria’s rebuilding and governance challenges means transitional justice systems must be designed with realistic institutional capacity in mind. Stretching institutions too far and too quickly could slow down early reforms.
One of Syria’s few steady anchors throughout the conflict, alongside emerging state institutions, has been its civil society. Syria’s transitional justice process and the emerging state institutions stand to gain from the active participation of its CSOs. They can guarantee victim and diaspora participation and the continued preservation of evidence in complex situations.
The extensive human, social, economic and infrastructural destruction requires transitional justice efforts to be established and funded with a long-term perspective. Short-term funding and strict conditions that diminish local ownership of the process should be avoided. Focusing on short-term, achievable, and measurable outcomes can help prevent donor fatigue, loss of interest, or a decline in public trust in transitional justice efforts before they have a chance to take hold.
Justice in Syria will also mean addressing housing, land, and property disputes. These issues shape where people feel safe returning, how communities rebuild themselves, and where tensions may flare.
A hybrid model may offer Syria a way to balance credibility with local ownership: it could draw on international rules for evidence, due process and witness protection, while anchoring the system in Syrian courts and staffed by Syrian professionals. The ECCC’s legacy could serve as a valuable guide for an independent process to select judges, provide witness protection, ensure victim participation, and grant reparations. Authorities should also consider developing a clear framework for how new mechanisms can work with existing ones, such as universal jurisdiction cases and IIIM evidence flows.
Whether Syria builds its architecture of rebirth through the newly formed transitional justice mechanisms or adopts a hybrid formula, the transitional justice process must be guided by Syrian priorities and political realities. Comparative experiences can inform the discussion, yet solely remain reference points rather than blueprints.
Kevin Toro Sánchez is a PhD candidate at KU Leuven, Belgium, specialising in civil society contributions to transitional justice. Kevin has research and work experience in Nepal, Zimbabwe, South Africa and Cambodia, where he currently serves as technical advisor to the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia. The views expressed in this article are strictly personal and do not necessarily reflect those of the institutions where Kevin has been affiliated.


